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Public Health-Seattle and King County, a metropolitan health department in western Washington, experiences rates of tuberculosis (TB) that are 1.6 times higher than are state and national averages. The department's TB Control Program uses public health emergency management tools and capabilities sustained with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention grant funding to manage large-scale complex case investigations.
We have described 3 contact investigations in large congregate settings that the TB Control Program conducted in 2015 and 2016. The program managed the investigations using public health emergency management tools, with support from the Preparedness Program.
The 3 investigations encompassed medical evaluation of more than 1600 people, used more than 100 workers, identified nearly 30 individuals with latent TB infection, and prevented an estimated 3 cases of active disease. These incidents exemplify how investments in public health emergency preparedness can enhance health outcomes in traditional areas of public health. (Am J Public Health. 2017;107:S142-S147. 
No. of Activations Emergency Capabilities
Note. The same incidents are represented multiple times on the chart under each capability mobilized for that response. 
FIGURE 1-Public Health Emergency Preparedness Capabilities Mobilized to

Supportive Housing Facility Investigation
In September 2016, a person at a supportive housing project that was home to 63 people was diagnosed with active TB disease. Sputum specimens of the index case were acid-fast bacilli smear negative, the chest radiograph showed noncavitary opacities, and TB polymerase chain reaction was positive. Because of the environmental assessment and the other residents' underlying medical conditions, evaluation of all residents and 21 staff members was essential. To manage the complex contact investigation, the TB Control Program partnered with the Preparedness Program, mobilized incident command, identified the need for outside resources, and developed daily incident action plans. Evaluation consisted of taking a history, including of TB symptoms and underlying medical conditions, as well as a tuberculin skin test (TST). Symptomatic individuals and those with newly positive TST results were transported to a nearby hospital to receive chest x-rays.
Most residents willingly participated in the medical evaluation. Residents were offered incentives to encourage participation in the screening process. One resident who had extensive contact with the initial case and was reporting symptoms consistent with active TB resisted testing to rule out active TB. In response, the TB control officer issued a public health directive that was followed by a court order requiring that the resident be evaluated. Close coordination among partners from the TB Control, Preparedness, and other public health programs; correctional facilities; law enforcement; and staff from the affected housing facility resulted in the at-risk individual undergoing medical evaluation.
Seven individuals were diagnosed with latent TB infection through the contact investigation, but no additional cases of active TB disease beyond the original case were identified. A second round of TB screening was conducted in early November to see if anyone converted to a positive test for TB infection or progressed to active TB. Public Health Reserve Corps volunteers and supplies from the department's emergency caches were mobilized to assist with the response.
High School X TB Investigation
In January 2015, a person at High School X was diagnosed with active TB. The TB Control Program collaborated with the school administration to establish a plan for notifying students and staff and evaluating identified contacts. The TB Control Program has established a protocol to interact with businesses and organizations whose employees or clients are exposed to TB and promptly reached out to inform, educate, and reassure school staff while coordinating the public health response. We screened 111 individuals using TSTs in the first or second rounds of evaluation conducted at the high school. Coincidentally, a second case of TB was reported from the same high school in a person who was not on the list of close contacts. This development led the TB Control Program and school to evaluate all students and staff, an additional 1107 individuals, across a 5-day span. Students and staff with symptoms or positive TST results were referred to a nearby outpatient clinic for chest radiographs and further management and treatment if appropriate.
The resources required to conduct these activities exceeded the capacity of the TB Control Program. An interjurisdictional public health mutual aid agreement developed through PHEP planning was used to mobilize TB nurses from neighboring counties and the Washington State Department of Health to assist. Public Health Reserve Corps volunteers also assisted with the contact investigation. Volunteers worked effectively alongside public health staff to conduct the investigation; maintain a call center to address inquiries and concerns from students, staff, and the public; enter and analyze data; and set up and break down testing and evaluation facilities. Even with this influx of outside resources, the high school response interfered with the TB Program's ability to conduct routine operations, and some services were temporarily suspended.
To summarize, the contact investigation of the first case identified 125 individuals for evaluation and 3 were diagnosed with latent TB infection. Following the extensive evaluation of all students and staff, 16 individuals were diagnosed with TB infection.
High School Y TB Investigation
In October 2016, a person at High School Y was diagnosed with active TB. As before, the TB Control Program collaborated with the school administration to establish a plan for notifying students, staff, and contacts identified by the screening. A largescale contact investigation was mobilized in November 2016 to evaluate students and staff using QuantiFERON-TB Gold In-Tube (Qiagen, Venlo, Netherlands). The logistics of notifying individuals of QuantiFERON-TB Gold In-Tube results and referring those with positive results were different from that for TSTs, and thus the action plan was modified from that used with High School X.
The King County Public Health Laboratory, a past recipient of PHEP funds, was instrumental in handling a large volume of specimens in a short time. A second round of screening was conducted a month later. Each round of testing included approximately 90 people. The testing identified 3 individuals with newly positive results and 2 with previous positive TST. Concerns in the community were addressed and perceptions were actively managed to help sustain public trust in local public health programs.
REVIEW
The contact investigations found a relatively low percentage of individuals to have latent TB infection. Infectiousness of the index case at the supportive housing project home was deemed low, but the investigation was conducted because of the high prevalence of vulnerable medical conditions. In a school setting, we have observed that TB transmission is uncommon, possibly because of environmental factors (e.g., space, ventilation), but contact investigations were conducted partly because they were high-profile situations.
APPLYING THE CAPABILITIES
Application of the PHEP capabilities to the TB contact investigations provided an opportunity to better integrate emergency preparedness principles into department operations by illustrating the usefulness of many of the PHEP capabilities in managing day-to-day events. Table 1 describes how 10 (of the 15) PHEP capabilities were used in the contact investigations we have described. The activities itemized in the table helped the agency test and improve systems that will be needed during a larger scale communicable disease or isolation and quarantine response; what is learned will inform current and future planning. With more than 1100 individuals affected, the largest TB contact investigation we have discussed represents a very large TB response but only a moderate scale incident when compared with other hazards the region faces, such as a 1918-style influenza pandemic.
CONCLUSIONS
King County's population is vulnerable to public health threats from across the globe, such as TB, H5N1 (influenza A virus subtype H5N1), SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome), coronaviruses, and Ebola. Local interventions to control the spread of TB and other communicable diseases promote health, stability, and economic growth in the county, the United States, and worldwide.
The large-scale TB contact investigations we have described provided an opportunity to test and improve Public HealthSeattle and King County's readiness to respond to a largescale communicable disease event, such as an influenza pandemic, and protected the community from 3 future cases of active TB. The positive health and emergency response outcomes achieved during the complex TB investigations could not have been achieved without the previous investments in planning, relationships, resources, tools, and training made possible by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention PHEP funding. Ten of the 15 PHEP capabilities were essential to the responses. The collaboration shown by the TB and Preparedness Programs during these investigations is unique in large urban health departments, where staff are specialized and programs can remain siloed.
We have discussed how the development of PHEP tools and capabilities and collaboration between the TB control and preparedness programs contributed to successful outcomes during 3 large-scale TB contact investigations in 2015 and 2016. It is difficult to ascertain whether the positive outcomes, such as timeliness and the number of people who were evaluated, could have been achieved without the county's significant investment in PHEP capabilities.
The prevention of TB and other communicable diseases as well as emergency preparedness are foundational public health services that must be present in every community to efficiently and effectively protect all people.
14 These services are also often local community priorities. Across the country, state and local funding for public health should ensure that the PHEP capabilities can be sustained in every community. Interventions like those we have described are costly and challenging for local health departments to finance.
As of this writing, consideration is being given to establishing a public health emergency fund in the federal budget to ensure that local health departments have the resources needed to respond to and recover from public health emergencies. Local health departments are critical to protecting the public's health in US cities and towns. In addition to being an investment in foundational public health services, an emergency fund would protect the public's health by ensuring that the US public health response force could better respond to disasters that can quickly overwhelm existing state and local resources.
